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Abstract 
In technology-based industries, many incumbent fIrms license their technology to other fIrms that will potentially 
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the literature on licensing by relaxing the widespread assumption of a "unique" technology holder. We develop a 
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1. Introduction 
Intellectual property rights, particularly patents and copyrights, are increasing in 
importance in a number of technology-intensive industries (see for instance, Cohen et aI., 
1996). Although fIrms typically use patents to hold off would-be competitors, many fIrms 
are also licensing their patents and associated technology to others.! There are some well-
known examples of large companies consciously adopting a strategy of licensing for 
generating revenue. For instance, in semi-conductors, Texas Instrument is reported to have 
earned royalties of over $1.8 billion between 1986 to 1993 through licensing, a fIgure 
comparable to Texas Instruments' cumulative net income during this period (Grindley and 
Teece, 1997). Other fIrms licensing semi-conductor technology include AT&T, IBM and 
SGS-Thompson. Similarly, in chemicals, a number of fIrms including Dow Chemicals, 
Exxon, Union Carbide, Nova Chemicals and Phillips Petroleum are actively licensing their 
metallocene catalyst technology2 for producing plastics (Arora and Fosfuri, 1998). The 
noteworthy feature is that all of the fIrms mentioned are large and have large market shares in 
the product markets. 
This constitutes something of a challenge to traditional wisdom, which holds that an 
innovator can best exploit innovations by commercializing them itself (e.g. Teece, 1988).3 In 
this view, licensing is undesirable both because the innovator has to share some of the rents 
with the licensee, and especially because licensing gives rise to increased competition and, 
hence, rent dissipation. But then how does one explain the use of licensing by major 
1 Elsewhere, we document the widespread incidence of licensing in the chemical industry (Arora, 1997 and 
Arora and F osfuri, 1998). Anand and Khanna (1997) in their study of strategic alliances find that licensing is 
common in other sectors such as biotechnology and computers as well, accounting for about 20 to 33% of all 
alliances, depending on the sector. They also find that licensing has increased in frequency between 1990-1993, 
the time period that they study. A recent survey, by a consulting firm, of 133 companies in the US, Japan and 
Western Europe in automotive, engineering, bio-pharmaceuticals and electronics found that 75% of firms 
license in technology and nearly 66% license out their technology. Furthermore, expenditure on licensing in 
technology are about 12% of total R&D budget (IPR Market Benchmark Study, by Business Planning and 
Research International, 1998, London). 
2 Metallocene catalysts are applied to a wide variety of polymers and provide better properties such as impact 
strength and toughness, melt characteristics and clarity in films. 
3 In the chemical industry, the question of whether or not licensing is sensible has been a matter of considerable 
debate by business consultants. For instance, Union Carbide has been criticized for its liberal licensing of its 
po\ypropylene/polyethylene Unipol process, with the claim that licensing reduced profitability, both for the 
industry, and also for Union Carbide itself (Spalding, 1986; Spitz, 1988). 
producers?4 In this paper we develop a simple model that characterizes the conditions under 
which producers license their technology. We use the model to explore how licensing 
decisions are affected by factors such as the nature of demand, the strength of intellectual 
property rights, and the extent of competition from other technology holders. 
As we show in the next section, our key departure from the literature on licensing is 
the relaxing ofthe assumption of a 'unique' innovator. With competition among technology 
holders, licensing can be privately rational, even if the joint profits of the incumbents fall. 
We formalize this intuition in section 3, where we characterize the conditions under which 
the equilibrium involves licensing and the effects of the nature of demand and of the 
intellectual property rights regime. Section 4 examines the socially efficient level of 
licensing and compares it to the equilibrium level of licensing. The licensing behavior of 
small versus large producers is analyzed in section 5. The next section shows that, with 
multiple licensors, increasing the efficiency of licensing contracts can diminish profitability 
and the incentives for R&D. Section 7 brings together our main findings and concludes the 
paper. 
2. Incentives to licensing with one and many technology holders 
2 
Why do firms license their technology? The typical answer is that they license if they 
are less efficient (or unable) at exploiting the invention than the potential licensee, or they 
attempt to establish their technology as a de-facto standard. Both ofthese motivations are 
well-known and accordingly, in this paper, we assume that neither applies. Instead, we focus 
on the role of licensing in rapidly expanding the use of technology. Typically, there are 
significant firm level adjustment costs or other constraints that restrict how rapidly an 
innovator can expand output. Thus, a technology holder can turn to licensing as a way of 
exploiting the technology more aggressively. In our model, these constraints are endogenous 
as the output of technology holders is constrained by the type of commitment problem that is 
well-known in Cournot competition. 5 In turn, this implies that we focus on non-exclusive 
4 Note also that network externality type phenomena are not important in the examples, so that licensing is not 
driven by a desire to establish the technology as a de-facto standard, a motive that is important for some 
licensing decisions in software and computers. 
5 A firm can more credibly commit itself to an expansion in production when it transfers the output decision to a 
separate entity (the licensee) rather than when it keeps such decision within the firm's boundaries. 
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licensing contracts, a common practice in technology licensing. (See for example, Anand and 
Khanna, 1997). 
We focus on the case when there are at least two technology holders in the market. 
Although the introduction of multiple technology holders might appear to be a small 
modification with respect to the acquired literature on licensing, it turns out to have profound 
effects on the predictions of the model and on the set of results one can derive.6 Specifically, 
the presence of competing technologies changes the payoff to the strategy of trying to keep 
one's technology in-house. Licensing imposes a negative pecuniary externality upon other 
incumbents, which is not taken into account by the licensor. As a result, if there are two or 
more incumbent firms that have proprietary technologies that are substitutes for each other, 
both firms may find it privately profitable to license, although their joint profits may well be 
higher in the absence of any licensing.7 
The intuition is easier to grasp with the help of a simple duopoly example. Suppose 
that two firms have independently developed their own technology suitable to produce a 
given (final or intermediate) product. What is the payoff of the licensing strategy? We need 
to consider two effects. The first, the revenue effect, is given by the rents earned by the 
licensee which will accrue to the patent holder in the form of licensing payments. The 
second, the rent dissipation effect, is given by the erosion of profits due to another firm 
competing in the downstream market. 
If there is only one incumbent in the market the rent dissipation effect dominates the 
revenue effect whenever industry profits are maximized by a monopoly (as is typically the 
case).8 Instead, when another incumbent exists the losses due to increased competition are 
6 While there are many examples where only one firm has got the leading technology in the market, one can 
easily find as many cases where there are at least two incumbent firms which have separately developed 
proprietary technologies. The chemical industry is a rich source of such examples although not the only one. 
For instance, a quick search on trade press showed that Union Carbide, Himont and Mobil compete with each 
other in selling polypropylene licenses (Morris, 1989); BP and Du Pont compete in polyethylene process 
technology (Mullin, 1993); in methyl tert butyl ethers (MTBE), UOP, Mobil-BP, and Phillips Petroleum are 
amongst the competing licensors (Rotman, 1993a). In cumene, MobillBadger are the latest entrants in the 
licensing market which also includes UOP, ABB Lummus Crest, and MonsantolKellog (Rotman, 1993b). 
7 Note that what is critical to the argument is competition in the downstream product market. In our model, 
only firms with access to the technology can produce. In principle, however, one can think of fringe firms that 
compete in the product market but do not have proprietary technology to license. These fringe firms can, by 
reducing the rent dissipation effect, induce licensing. In this paper we do not explore this possibility further and 
instead focus on competition between technology holders. 
8 In general, the revenue effect may prevail whenever there is more than one incumbent. If ;r(n) represents the 
profit of the typical firm when there are n firms in the industry, then an incumbent's marginal payoff from 
shared with the other incumbent in the market so that the licensor does not fully internalize 
the rent dissipation effect. If the revenue effect is larger than the rent dissipation effect, then 
firms compete not only to supply the products but also to supply their technologies.9 The 
existing theoretical literature on licensing cannot explain why large established firms are 
licensing their technology at the cost of increasing competition for themselves, because it 
assumes 'unique' technology holder. 1O With a single technology holder, the rent dissipation 
effect is typically larger than the revenue effect for firms capable of large-scale production. 
The revenue effect also depends on the strength of intellectual property rights and the 
relative bargaining power of the licensor and licensee. Our results confirm that stronger 
property rights and greater bargaining power of the licensor lead to more licensing. The 
degree of product differentiation across technologies has an important influence on the 
magnitude of the two effects. If the goods are differentiated the licensee will be a much 
stronger competitor of the technology holder than of the other incumbent(s). This enhances 
the rent dissipation effect (which is now internalized to a greater extent by the licensor) and 
reduces the profitability of the licensing strategy. Thus we find that licensing will be more 
widespread, the lower the degree of product differentiation. 
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Moreover, one would expect that the rent dissipation effect would depend on the 
production and commercial capabilities of the licensor: Large, well-established producers 
have less to gain from licensing and more to lose from competition. Our results confirm that, 
all else held equal, research labs license more. Interestingly enough, the model also throws 
up a less straightforward result, namely that the presence of independent labs may induce a 
producer-innovator to license more as well. 
licensing (assuming the licensor captures all the surplus) is 21,(n + 1) - K(n). For n = 1, it is typically assumed 
that the marginal payoff is negative. Although the latter condition constitutes a valuable benchmark, our results 
hold true even if an oligopoly with k > 1 finns maximizes industry profits. 
9 This might explain why in some industries we find that finns are liberal in licensing their technologies and 
often compete each other in selling licenses, a strategy which would reduce the profitability both for the 
industry as a whole and for the finns. 
10 Indeed, much of the literature has focused on the optimal licensing behavior of the inventor once it has 
developed and patented a new technology or production process (see Gallini and Wright, 1990; Kamien and 
Tauman, 1986). When the innovator is also active in the product market then either only minor innovations are 
licensed (Gallini, 1984; Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Rockett, 1990a) or licensing is used strategically to enhance 
demand (Shepard, 1987) or to choose competitors after the patent expires (Rockett, 1990b) or to deter entry 
(Gallini, 1984). Some of the literature also focuses on how licensing might encourage or refrain finns from 
investing in R&D (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Gallini and Winter, 1985). Although we do not fonnally model the 
R&D stage of the game, we shall comment on this issue in section 6. 
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We also use the model to derive conditions for a policy aimed to stimulate licensing to 
be welfare improving. Licensing is typically welfare improving when we have few patent 
holders. Instead, when competition in the market for technology is high, we show that, at the 
equilibrium, one can actually have too much licensing compared to the socially efficient level of 
licensing. 
3. The model 
Consider a sector where N firms have independently developed and patented 
proprietary technologies for the production of a good. Such a good can either be perfectly 
homogeneous across technologies or differentiated. When the good is differentiated, each 
technology is suited to produce a given variety of it, with each variety being an imperfect 
substitute of all the others. 11 
Besides the N patent holders we assume that there exist many potential entrants who 
do not have innovative capabilities but can produce if they receive the rights to use the 
technology from one of the incumbents. Incumbents can therefore both produce themselves 
(by using their installed production facilities) and license their technology to potential 
entrants. When the good is homogeneous across technologies, a licensee is located in the 
product space at the same distance from all the other producers. The greater the degree of 
product differentiation, the closer the licensee is in the product space to the licensor, relative 
to other incumbents. 
Let k; -1 be the number oflicenses sold out by firm i = 1, 2, ... ,N. Hence, the total 
number of firms that have the technology and can produce the (differentiated) good is equal 
N 
to L k;. Qualitative results would not change if one assumes the existence of a fringe of 
;=1 
firms that can get access to the technology without obtaining a license from one of the 
technology holders (for instance, through imitation). 12 For analytical tractability we shall 
consider ki and N to be continuous variables. 
11 For tractability, we assume symmetry across all varieties. This amounts to assuming that each technology 
variant is equally differentiated with respect each one of the other variants. 
12 Details are available from the authors upon request. 
Technology transfer from the licensor to the licensee involves a fixed cost, F, which 
captures the transaction costs oflicensing. We also assume that (J E [0,1] is the share 
accruing to the licensor of total profits earned by its licensee through the use of the 
technology. \3 Both F and 0' help account for the costs associated with the arms' length 
contracts, although we do not explicitly model the details of the contractual arrangements. 14 
Note that we do not allow collusion in the product market, even though in principle such 
collusion can be achieved through suitable licensing contracts. Although such contracts are 
feasible, they are rare and likely to be prosecuted as anti-competitive. 
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We analyze the following two-stage game. First, each patent holder decides how 
many licenses to sell out to potential entrants ("competition in the market for technology") 
and then, all firms that have got the technology supply the (differentiated) good ("competition 
in the downstream market"). We proceed by backward induction. 
Competition in the downstream market (stage two). 
We assume Coumot competition in the downstream market. 15 Inverse demand 
function for each variety i has the following linear schedulel6 : 
(1) 
for any i = 1, 2, ... , N, where Pi denotes the price, the first summation is across quantities 
supplied by firms producing i, and the second summation is across all quantities supplied by 
firms endowed with technology different from i (Mi stands for all varieties but i). 
Here, a key parameter is Ji, which captures for the degree of product differentiation 
across varieties. We assume that Ji E [0,1], with varieties being homogeneous for Ji = 1 and 
13 There are several reasons for the licensor not to be able to extract the fun rents generated by its technology: 
asymmetric information, weak intellectual property regime, bargaining power, uncodifiability of knowledge, 
etc. 
14 For instance, the licensor might choose a combination of royalties and lump sum payments to maximize 
profits. Since, in our model there are no production costs, this formulation corresponds to a royalty fee on total 
sales - a practice that is widespread in licensing contracts (Arora, 1995; Anand and Kanna, 1997). The design of 
the optimal license contract, for both exclusive and non-exclusive contracts has been studied by Katz and 
Shapiro (1986), Gallini and Wright (1990) and Arora (1995) among others, and is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
IS Some of the results hold under very general functional forms, as noted below. 
16 Notice that this demand structure could be derived from the maximization of a quadratic utility function (see 
for instance, Singh and Vives, 1984, and Sutton, 1998). 
completely differentiated (independent) for p = O. To keep things as simple as possible, we 
assume that all technologies allow production at zero marginal cost. Also, notice that we are 
implicitly imposing that the good is perfectly homogeneous within the group (i.e. all firms 
using the same technology) and equally differentiated across all groups. 
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Denote by "i (ki' k_i' p, N) the profits accruing to each firm endowed with technology 
i in the last stage of the game, where ki stands for the vector {k], k2, ... , kj _], k j+], ... kN} of 
firms endowed with technologies different from i. 
Result 1: Given kdlrms producing variety i = 1, 2, ... ,N, profits of each final 
producer are: 
where A = [1 + (1- p )k;] and B = [1 + L (flkJ)]. 
N 1+ I-pkJ 
Furthermore, "i is increasing and convex in kj • 
Proof See the Appendix. 
(2) 
Notice that for p = 0 each firm's profit only depends on the number of firms 
producing that given variety. Instead, for p = 1, "i depends on the total number of firms 
N 
active in the market L ki • 
;=1 
Competition in the market for technology (stage one). 
Given the results of quantity competition in the last stage of the game one can express 
each patent holder's profit as a function of the number of firms producing each variety of the 
good, k; and k j • That is: 
(3) 
Each technology holder i chooses kj in order to maximize its total profit given by the 
expression above. The first order condition is therefore: 
Vk = air; +[I+a(k; -I)]n-i -F~O fork; -I~O. 
The second order condition is given by 17: 
Vkk = 2alrk + [I + a(k; -I)]n-ik 
while the stability condition for the equilibrium requires that (see Dixit, 1986) 18 
N 
- V Lk- ± I V ~.k. ~ 0 . 





From the first order condition (expression (4)), one can identify the two effects due to 
licensing we have discussed in the introduction. 19 The first one, air; , is positive and 
corresponds to the revenue effect, which we defined as the increase in profits due to a 
marginal increase in the number of licensees (and hence in the license fees obtained). The 
second, [I + a(k; -I )]n-~ , is negative and corresponds to the profit dissipation effect due to an 
increase in the final stage competition (through licensing the patent holder creates more 
competition which lowers profits). The magnitude of these two effects and the value of F 
determine whether firms license at equilibrium and if so, how many licenses are sold. Before 
studying in detail the licensing equilibrium, we want to stress again how important is the 
presence of competitors in the licensing decision of the innovator. To this end, assume that N 
= 1. Then we can state: 
Result 2: lfN = 1, no licensing occurs at equilibrium. The presence of 
competingfirms expands the parameters' space under which licensing occurs at 
equilibrium. 
Proof The first order condition can be rewritten as 
. 1 ] 2 V~(N=I)=a 2 -[I+a(k;-I) 3- F (I + k; ) (I + k; ) 
17 At any interior equilibrium, the second order condition for local maximum is always satisfied. 
Appendix. 
18 As we shall discuss later there is only one stable equilibrium with licensing. 




which is always negative for any k; ~ 1. Now, assume N ~ 2 and all patent holders but i 
hold fixed the number of licenses sold out at kj • For simplicity assume that p tends to 1. It is 
easy to check that the first order condition for firm i can be rewritten as 
which is positive for small values of F and crclose to 1, evaluated at ki = 1, and ~ C 1. 
This result illustrates the key idea behind our framework with more technology 
holders. While a monopolist innovator would not license out its technology to firms 
competing in the same market, the simple fact that we move from N = 1 to N ~ 2 gives rise 
to a strategic effect which can induce firms to license out their technology. 
We can now solve for the symmetric equilibrium of the second stage of the game and 
explore how the optimal number of licenses is affected by the parameters of our model. 
Proposition 1: a) A symmetric Nash equilibrium generically exists; b) Both the 
non-licensing equilibrium (NLE) and the licensing equilibrium (LE) can coexist; 
c) There exists at most one stable LE. 
Proof See the Appendix. 
Since we focus here on symmetric equilibria alone, we can simplify the analysis of 
existence and stability by defining <1>(k ,cr,p,N) == V/(ki = k,k_i = k,cr,p,N), i.e. as the , 
marginal revenue from licensing evaluated at a symmetric licensing level, k. Note that the set 
of symmetric equilibria is given by <1>(k) = F. Notice further that stability requires that 
In Figure 1, the parameters' values chosen are such that we have a unique stable 
licensing equilibrium (LE). Figure 2 shows a case of multiple equilibria, where the non-
licensing (NLE) and the licensing equilibrium (LE) coexist. It turns out that this is the only 
case in which we have multiplicity of stable equilibria. In the Appendix we work out 
necessary conditions for existence of the LE and multiple equilibria. Figure 2 also helps 
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underscore the importance of the presence of competitors in shaping the licensing decision of 
the innovator. For the range of parameter values depicted in figure 2, no firm would license 
out its technology if the competitors would not do it, but when all the other firms are 
licensing the best response is to license as well. 
We proceed now by analyzing the symmetric stable equilibrium. Denote by Vk the 
first order condition evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium. One can then show the 
following: 
Proposition 2: In a symmetric stable equilibrium, k is non-decreasing in a and 
non-increasing in F. 
Proof The key to the proof is that in a symmetric stable equilibrium, the direction of 
change of k depends only on the sign of the cross-partial of the payoff function. One can 
directly verify that v"a ~ 0 and v"F :::; 0, thus giving us the required results. 
The interpretation in the case of cr is straightforward: Proposition 2 implies that any 
factor that increases the bargaining power of licensors, or decreases the transaction costs 
involved in licensing will increase licensing. The interpretation with respect to F is more 
interesting from a policy perspective. Arora and Gambardella (1994), Anand and Khanna 
(1997) and Merges (1998), have argued that stronger intellectual property rights reduce the 
transaction costs of technology licensing. If so, then our result finds empirical support in 
Anand and Khanna (1997). Based on a sample of 1612 licensing agreements, they find that 
sectors where IPRs are strong are also those with a higher incidence oflicensing activity, 
while sectors with weak IPRs tend to have joint ventures and other such bundled 
arrangements for transferring technology. Note also that Proposition 2 is completely general 
and does not rely on the assumption of Cournot competition in the downstream market. 
Moreover, it applies both to the NLE and LE. 
We now examine how the the number of competitors, N, and the degree of product 
differentiation in the market, jl, affect licensing. 
Proposition 3: For F = 0, in a symmetric stable equilibrium, the number of 
licenses by each technology holder is non-decreasing in N 
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Proof. At the symmetric stable equilibrium, the direction of change of k depends only 
on the sign of the cross-partial of the payoff function. By differentiating Vk with respect to N, 
one obtains: 
V /eN = m, N + [1 + cr(k; -1)}r/eN. (10) 
Using Vk = 0 we can rewrite (10) as: 
(11) 
where the expression between parenthesis can be showed to be always positive (see the 
Appendix). Hence, VkN > 0 at F = o. 
From expression (10) one can see that an increase in the number of incumbents 
involves two forces working in opposite directions. More competition reduces the magnitude 
of the revenue effect, reducing the payoff from licensing. However, more competition also 
reduces the size of the profit dissipation effect and hence reduces the opportunity cost of 
licensing. 
At F = 0 the second force prevails. Under positive transaction costs, the two forces 
have different magnitudes, and only a weaker version of proposition 3 survives. The intuition 
is borne out by Figure 3. We have drawn the (/J(k, N) curve for two different level of N, NI 
and N2, with N2 > NI. By proposition 2, (/J(k, N2) crosses the horizontal axe to the right of 
(/J(k, NI). However, for a set of parameter values, the curves cross in the positive quadrant (at 
k > 1). This implies that, for large values of F, an increase in N could decrease the 
equilibrium number of licenses. We can partially characterize the situation as follows: 
Result 4: There exists an N* > 2, such that, in a symmetric stable equilibrium 
with licensing, k is increasing in N for any N < N*, and decreasing in N for any N 
> N*. Further, N* is decreasing in Jl, F and er. 
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Proof See simulations in the Appendix. 
This result implies that even with positive transaction costs, increases in competition 
in the market for technology initially increase licensing. Only later, as the number of patent 
holders increases, further increases in competition decrease licensing by reducing the 
profitability of the product market. 
We now state and prove one of the most robust results of the paper which can also be 
empirically tested most easily. The intuition is quite straightforward. When the good is 
highly differentiated, each firm has a well-defined market niche. Any entrant the patent 
holder will license will be a closer competitor to the patent holder itself, and the negative 
pecuniary externality for other incumbents will be smaller. When the good is homogeneous, 
the licensor benefits from the fact that the negative effect due to increased competition is 
spread across all incumbents, while it obtains all (or part of) the profits of the new entrants. 
As with the static comparative with respect to N, there are two forces at work. On the 
one hand, less differentiation implies a smaller revenue effect, but on the other hand, it also 
reduces the profit dissipation effect. It turns out that the second force always prevails. This 
result is robust and holds also for Bertrand competition with a multinomiallogit demand 
specification (see the Appendix for more details). 
Proposition 4: At any LE that involves at least one license per patent holder, k is 
non-decreasing in JL. 
Proof. We prove it by contradiction. First, notice that in a symmetric stable 
equilibrium, the direction of change of k depends only on the sign of the cross-partial of the 
payoff function. By differentiating Vk with respect to p, one obtains: 
Vkp = a1[ p + [1 + a(k; -l)}rkP . (12) 
where 1[ p < 0 and 1[ kp > 0 (see the Appendix). Then, suppose that Vkp < 0, which implies 
that VkpCT < o. Take a = 1. Ifwe prove that Vkp cannot be negative at a = 1, then it must be 
the case that it cannot be negative for any a. Indeed, one can show that such that for all 
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admissible parameter values, k ~ 2 implies Vkp < 0 .20 Hence, Vkp must be positive at any 
k~2. 
Patterns of teclmology licensing in the chemical industry provide empirical support 
for proposition 4. Elsewhere (see Arora and Fosfuri, 1998) we find that the per-firm number 
of licenses decreases with the degree of product differentiation in the chemical industry. 
Homogeneous sectors like air separation, pulp and paper, and petrochemicals are marked by 
extensive licensing, while we observe only limited licensing by producers in differentiated 
product groups like pharmaceuticals and organic chemicals. 
4. Welfare 
Does a policy which stimulates licensing always increase welfare? The answer is not 
always in the affirmative and it turns out that under certain circumstances we might have too 
much licensing with respect to the socially efficient level. 
In computing the socially efficient level of licensing we assume that the market 
structure is given (i.e. N is exogenous) and that firms compete cl la Cournot in the 
downstream market. Therefore, the social planner can only choose the symmetric number of 
licenses per-firm, k. 
Welfare is the sum of consumer surplus21 and net industry profits, i.e. 
(13) 
where x = [1 + (1- ,Ll)k + ,uNk ]-1. 
Result 5: The socially efficient number of licenses per-firm is 
20 Although licensing implies that k should be no less than two, the result reported in proposition 4 holds at any 
k> J when either F = 0, or N < J 5, or if product differentiation is low enough. (See the Appendix for details.) 
21 The expression for the consumer surplus can be derived from a quadratic utility function of the form 
U(XI , ... ,X N) = LX; - O.5LX;2 - f.i LLX;X.i' where X; = LX; (see for instance, Sutton, 
; j# 
1998), or integrating the inverse demand function at the symmetric k and x. 
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Proof. Follows directly by maximizing expression (13) with respect to k. 
Notice that kS is decreasing in Nand f.J and tends to infinity as F goes to zero. 
Furthermore, it does not depend on er. The latter is helpful for our main result with respect to 
welfare. 
Proposition 5: There exists an N°? 2 such that for any N < N~ kS> k* andfor 
anyN ~N~ kS~k*. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
The reason why there might be excessive licensing at the equilibrium is because of the 
transaction costs, which are clear dead-losses associated with licensing. As N becomes larger 
this inefficiency tends to grow. Indeed, the following corollary helps to highlight this aspect 
of proposition 5: 
Corollary 1: At F = 0, private licensing is always insufficient, i. e. k* < kS. 
Proof. Notice that N° tends to infinity as F tends to zero, which implies that for any N 
< 00, k* < kS. 
Finally, we consider possible policy interventions aimed to increase the share of 
profits accruing to the licensor, 0". For instance, policies that lower the cost of patent 
enforcement, or that raise the penalties for patent infringement will increase the share of 
profits that the licensor can extract. Result 6 shows that a policy aimed to rise 0" is likely to 
improve welfare when there are few technology holders, transaction costs are small and 
products are rather differentiated. Note also that Result 6 provides only a sufficient condition 
for such policies to be welfare improving, and such policies may be desirable even otherwise. 
15 
Result 6: Any policy that increases u is welfare improving lif N ~ N = 2 + 1 ~ /::; . 
- JlVF 
Proof Since N° is decreasing in u, N < N°, where N = Nicr=l' Hence, by proposition 5 
private licensing is insufficient. By proposition 2, k* is non-decreasing in u, therefore an 
increase in u enhances welfare. 
5. Small firms and research labs 
In this section we analyze how the equilibrium of the game would be affected by the 
presence of firms with limited production capability (i.e. small firms and research labs). To 
this purpose, consider a slightly more general profit function for the innovator: 
(14) 
where A ~ 0 captures for the size of the installed production facilities. Large values of A are 
associated with big corporations, while A = 0 corresponds to the case of research labs. We 
can then derive the following result: 
Result 7: ki* is decreasing in A. 
Proof Consider the first order condition for firm i: V: = [A + u(k; -1 )}r~ + un i - F . 
Take any pair (d:,I) such that d: < I. Since n~ < 0, it is easy to see that 
V; = [I + u(ki(d:)-I)~~ + mri - F < 0, which implies that ki(I)< k;(d:). 
In other words, small firms and research labs tend to license more than big 
corporations. The intuition behind this result is fairly simple: having little or no production 
capability means that the extent of the profit dissipation effect is smaller and, hence, licensing 
is a more appealing strategy. 
Perhaps less obvious is how the presence of research labs influences the licensing 
behavior of firms with installed production facilities. Consider the case of a duopoly where 
instead of having two producers (i.e. two firms with installed production facilities), one of 
them is replaced by a research lab. Then, we have the following result 
Result 8: In a duopoly setting, substituting a producer with a research lab 
increases the number o/licenses sold out by the remaining producer. 
Proof Consider the cross-partial of the profit function in (14) with respect to k; and 
kj, i.e. v"k = o-r(k; -l)7ru + 7rk.]+ A7ru .. Now, assume that Vu) ~ o. Since 
'J ~ IJ J 'J ' 
A7r u. > 0, this implies that r(k; -1)7r kk) + 7r k ] < 0 and therefore that Vkka < o. Hence, I ) ~ I J I J 
Vu (k) la~1 ~ Vu (k) la<1 ~ o. Finally, one can show that there are no combinations of 
I J I ) 
parameters such that at 0- = 1 and k; = kj, Vu. (k ) ~ 0 at any k > 1. 
, J 
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What result 8 illustrates is an inducement effect: The presence of a research lab 
stimulates the licensing activity of the big firm at a level that it wouldn't have reached 
otherwise.22 Elsewhere (see Arora and Fosfuri, 1998) we provide some empirical support to 
results 7 and 8. Using data from the chemical industry, we find both that firms without 
downstream facilities tend to license more and that in product groups where such firms 
operate more intensively, large chemical producers themselves tend to license more. 
6. Incentives for R&D 
In section 4, we have established sufficient conditions for an increase in the per-firm 
number oflicenses to be socially desirable. Note well that our definition of welfare takes as 
exogenously given the number oflicensors in the economy. But as well understood in the 
literature on innovations, an increase in the rate of diffusion also implies a smaller incentive 
to develop the innovation in the first place. This is precisely what occurs in our model where 
a larger k means lower per-firm profits. 
22 Does result 8 fully generalize? One can show that at F = 0, Vu. > 0 (see the Appendix), which implies that 
, J 
in a model with no transaction costs the presence of research labs always increases the number of licenses sold 
out by all other producers. For positive values of F, result 8 holds unchanged provided that N is small enough. 
Proposition 6: With ex-ante symmetric licensors, the possibility o/licensing 
reduces profits per innovator. 
Proof Licensor's profits in a symmetric equilibrium are: 
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V (k*) = [1 + a{k * -1 )11 + (1- f1 )k * + JiNk * ] - (k * -1)F. Taking the derivative with respect to 
k* it is easy to show that it is always negative. 
Proposition 6 also suggests that patent holders might have incentives to collude in 
order to reduce or stop licensing and hence increase profits. An example of such a practice is 
provided by the history of the chemical sector. Before WWII, cartels were widespread. The 
major technology leaders, which were typically European firms, adopted a strict control over 
their licensing policies in order to keep market shares, deter entry and sustain prices above 
competitive levels (see Arora, 1997). 
Factors that affect incentives to license therefore have ambiguous effects. For 
instance, an increase in transaction costs or a decrease in the bargaining power of the licensor 
(i.e. share of profits extractable from the licensee) might actually increases profits for 
imlOvators (and hence, the incentives to undertake R&D). Using the envelope theorem one 
. ( \_ . "dV i dk. 
can show that V~ = k -1 F' I + ~ ----' , where the second term is negative and 
J,,"i dk J da 
. dV i dk. 
V/-a = -(k -1)+ I----l , where the second term is positive. The effect of a(or F) on 
j# dk j dF 
firms' profit is ambiguous since two forces are pushing in opposite directions: on the one 
hand, a larger a(or a smaller F) increases licensor's profit; on the other hand, it also 
stimulates (by proposition 2) the licensing activity of all the other competitors and hence 
reduces profits. 
7. Conclusion 
There is increasing evidence about the importance of intellectual property rights in 
many sectors of the economy. Firms in these sectors are looking to profit from the 
intellectual property not just by embodying it in their own output but also by licensing their 
intellectual property to others, including potential competitors. Such behavior is difficult to 
18 
understand in the context of models with only a single technology holder, who by definition 
faces no competition in the product market. 
By relaxing the widespread assumption of a 'unique' patent holder, our paper shows 
that licensing might be the result of firms' strategic behaviors. Indeed, the presence of 
competition drastically changes the incentives for an incumbent to license its technology to 
potential entrants. In particular, when there are multiple technology holders, they not only 
compete in the downstream market but also in the market for technology. Thus, our paper 
provides an initial framework for analyzing the nature and properties of markets for 
technology. 
Within this framework, we showed that the propensity to license decreases the higher 
the transaction costs, the lower the bargaining power of the licensor and the lower the 
protection of intellectual property rights. Also, we found that the average number of licenses 
sold out by each patent holder is a decreasing function of the degree of product differentiation 
in the sector. Finally, we showed that small firms and firms without downstream activity 
tend to license more and that their presence might induce large corporations to license more 
as well. 
Markets for technology imply technology diffusion and increased entry, which 
improves the static efficiency of markets. However, by inducing entry, markets for 
technology may reduce the incentives to undertake R&D. Moreover, if licensing involves 
transaction costs, our model suggests that the presence of competitors in the market for 
technology might induce firms to an inefficiently high level of licensing. In general, policies 
aimed to stimulate licensing are likely to be welfare improving when there are few 
technology holders and products are differentiated. 
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7. Appendix 
A. Proof of result 1 
Take any firm i (either patent holder or licensees) producing variety i. By maximizing firm i's profits with 
respect to its own quantity we obtain the following first order condition: 
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1- LX; -,uLLxj -x; =0. (A.I) 
k; NI; kj 
First, impose symmetry across firms using the same technology. Then, by adding and subtracting ,u LX; we 
obtain: 
from which 
1- k;x; -,u Lkjxj - x; + ,uk;x; = 0 
N 
I-,uLkjXj 
x. = N 
, 1 + (1- ,u)k j . 
Now, multiply both sides by ,uki and sum up across all possible varieties to obtain: 
_[ ],ilk) L,ukjXj - 1- L,ukjx) L ( ) 
N N Nl+I-,ukj 
which after some manipulation can be rewritten as 
1 
L,uk jX j = ------
N 1+ 1 L ,uk j 





Then, substituting (A.5) in (A.3) and simplifying we obtain the equilibrium quantity by each firm (either patent 
holder or licensee) producing variety i as a function of the numbers of firms active in the production of all 
varieties (kJ. k2 . ... , kN): 
Xi =[1 + (I-,u)ki]-I[l+ I (j) ]-1 
1+ I-Ilk· N ,.. ] 
(A.6) 
Replacing expression (A.6) in (1) we can compute the equilibrium price for each variety, and then profits as 
reported in result 1. Furthermore, with some algebra one can derive 1l"~ = -2A-4 B-3 [AB(I- ,u)+ ,u] < 0 
B. Second order condition is satisfied at any stable LE. 
We want to show that Vlk < O. The second order condition is Vlk = 20"1l"k + [1 + O"(ki -I)}rkk' Using 
. . F - o"1(i. . F - O"1l"i f . \2 3 
the first order condition, one can write V~k = 20"1l"1 + . 1l"1k = 20"1l"1 + . \1l"1} --.. 
1(' 1(' 21(' 
. k k 
Simplifying further we obtain Vlk = 1l"i[O" + 3F.] < O. 
2 21(' 
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C. Proof of result 3. 
Recall that f!J(k) is the marginal revenue from licensing evaluated at the symmetric licensing configuration. We 
can rewrite f/J(k) = g(k) I(k) , where g(k) is quadratic in k, with gkk < 0, and 
f(k) = [1 +k(1 +u(N-l))j3 >0. 
1 + {1- ,u)k 
Consider any value of p < I. (At P = J and F = 0, a symmetric Nash equilibrium might not exist). Let kj and 
k2 be the two roots of g(k) = 0, with k2 > kj. Notice that since g(k) < 0 at any k > k2 then at any k > k2, f!J(k) 
must be negative if(k) is always positive). Now, let f/J(I) - F < O. Hence, a symmetric Nash equilibrium exists 
where no firms license. On the contrary, let f/J(I) - F > O. Since f/J(k) < 0 for any k > k2 then it must be that k2 
> I. Since f!J(k) is continuous for k> 0, then at least one stable LE must exist. 
To show uniqueness of the stable LE we take some intermediate steps. First, notice that f!Jk = 0 is cubic in k. 
Hence, f!J(k) has three inflection points. Second, we show that one inflection point is on the right of k2. To this 
purpose notice that f!J(k) tends to zero as k approaches infinity. Moreover, f!J(k) < 0 at any k > k2, which 
implies that there must exists a k3 > k2 such that f!Jk(k3) = O. Third, we show that f/J(k) has only one inflection 
point for f!J(k) > O. (See Figure 4a and 4b.) Suppose that f!Jk(l) > 0, then since f!Jk(kj < 0, we only have an odd 
number of inflection points in the interval [l,~]. Since the maximum number of inflection points for k < k2 is 
two, then there must be only one inflection point in the interval [I, k2]. By a similar argument one can exclude 
multiplicity of inflection points in the interval [I, k2] for f!J(k), when f!Jk(l) < 0 and f/J(I) < O. Finally, consider 
the case where f!Jk(l) < 0 and f!J(l) > O. One can show that, under these two conditions, f!Jk(k) < 0 for any k < 
k2. Indeed, f!Jk(l) < 0 and f!J(l) > 0 imply that gk(l) < 0 which implies that gk < 0 at all k > I. But gk < 0 
implies f!Jk(k) < 0 for any k belonging to the inverval [I, k2]. Only one inflection point in the interval [1, k2] 
means that f!J(k) = F can at most have two roots. It is then easy to see that only the larger root is stable. 
Finally, a necessary and sufficient condition for having multiple equilibria is that the smallest root of f!J(k) = F is 
greater than I. (See Figure 2.) We show necessary conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in the 
next section. 
D. Necessary conditions for the existence of the symmetric stable LE and for the existence of multiple 
equilibria. 
We first derive the set of conditions which insure the existence of a symmetric stable LE at F = O. Such 
conditions are only necessary at F > 0 (while they are also sufficient at F = 0). 
Let kj and k2 be the two roots of f/J(k) = 0, with k2 > kj. For the existence of a symmetric stable LE we want k2 
be a real number greater than 1 (greater than two if we are only interested in integer values of k). It turns out 
this is the case when the following two conditions are satisfied: fJ2 - 4ar ;::: 0 and a + fJ + r < 0, where 
fJ = a{I-,u)+ [1 + ,u{N -1)12{1- o'Xl- ,u)- a], r = 2 - 3a anda = a{I-,u Xl + ,u{N -1)]. It is 
easy to check that both conditions are satisfied for large values of p, (1' and N. 
To derive necessary conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria (sufficient at F = 0) one has to force kj to 
be greater than J. This is the case when the following conditions are simultaneously satisfied: fJ2 - 4ar ;::: 0 , 
2a + fJ < 0 and a + fJ + r > O. It is easy to check that all conditions hold for small values of (1', 
intermediate values of N and large values of p (for instance, (1' = 0.25, N = 5, P = 0.98). 
E. Proof of proposition 2 
With some algebra one can show that: tr N = -2,ukA-3 B-3 and tr /eN = 2,ukA-5 B-4 [2(1- ,u )AB + 3,u]. It 
tr 2kA-3 B-3 
follows that tr N - tr ~ = (,u) , which is always non-negative. 
tr k 1 - ,u AB + ,u 
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F. Proof of result 4 
First, notice that at N = 1, V /eN > o. Second, we prove that V /eN > 0 at N = 2. Indeed, 
VkN IN=2.er=1 = 2pkC-3 [- AC + 2Ck(l- p)+ 3pk] where A = [1 + (1- p)k] and C = [1 + (1 + p)k]. 
Notice also that if V/eN is not negative at u = 1, then it is not negative at any a. Simplifying further we obtain 
that sign~ /eN I N=2 er=l } = sign{k 2 -1 + pk - p2 e ,which is always positive. Hence, V /eN I N=2 > o. 
Now, to show that V /eN > 0 for N < N* and VkN < 0 for N > N* we use simulations (Mathematica's files are 
available from the authors upon request). In the figures 5a, 5b and 5c we plot the equilibrium value of k as a 
function of N, holding constant all other parameters (0; J.1, F), but one. k*(N) is obtained by solving 
<D(k,"if, Ji, N) = F. In each figure the value of N* corresponds of the inflection point of k*(N). Notice that 
the curves joining the inflection points show the response of N* to 0; /1, and F respectively in figure 5a-c. 
G. Additional results related to proposition 3 
G.I. V'"p > 0 at any k > 1 and F= O. 
By differentiating Vk with respect to /1, one obtains: 
VkP = (J7r p + [1 + (J(k; -1)}rkp. (G.I) 
Using Vk = 0 we can rewrite (G.l) as: 
v.
p ~+rp -<::) (G.2) 
With some additional algebra one can show that trp = -2A-3 B-3k(N -1) and 7rkp > o. Simplifying further 
( 
7rkP ) (JA-3B-3uk(N -1)(B + 1) 
one obtains that V'"p = (J 7r p - 7r - = > 0 . 
7rk AB(1- p) + p 
G.2. V'"p > 0 at any k > 1 and /1 = 1. 
Some tedious algebra suffices to show that 
V. I = 2k(N-IX(4 + kNX1-(J)+ (J(4k-l +(k-l)kN)] >0. 
kp p=l (1 + kN)4 
G.3. V'"p > 0 at any k > 1 and N < 15. 
Notice that VkJler < o. Take u = 1. If we prove that Vkp cannot be negative at u = 1, then it must be the case 
that it cannot be negative for any u. Solve VkPL=1 = 0 with respect to N. Only the largest root, N"(k, /1) is of 
interest to us. Vkp is negative at any N > N". Such a root is increasing in k. Take k = 1. Then, one can show 
that the lower bound of N" is at p = 2(2 -.J3) and it is equal to 14.92. 
H. Proof of proposition 5 
Take the first order condition evaluated at the symmetric k; = kj = kS, i.e. Vk; Ik=k=kS ' Then, solve for the 
, J 
value of N, such that Vk; lk=k.=kS = O. One can show that 
, J 
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. _ e -~)[ 2<TJl+ (1- Jl{1 + v"F )] Jl-I . • 
N (er,p,F)- ( X ) VF[ ( )]+--. It IS easy to see that for anyN< N , 
er - 2 1- p I-er - F 1 + 2pl- er p 




bound at () = 1. Evaluating N° at () = 1, one obtains N = N° 1 = 2 + 1 r;::; ~ 2 . 
- 0"= PV F 
I. Vu > 0 at F= o. 
, J 
Write VH . = er" k. + [1 + er(k; -1)}r H .. Using the first order condition one obtains I )} , J 
(
"k."k - ""H. J -2A-2 B-3 
Vk,k j =er J' 'J ,where "ki = l ( ) J2 and 
" k j 1 + 1 - P k j 
2A-4 B-4 p 
" kk. = [( ) ]2 [2AB( 1 - p) + 3 p ]. Some additional algebra shows that 
'J 1+ I-pkj 
2erA-6 B-6 p 
J. BERTRAND COMPETITION WITH MULTINOMIAL LOGIT DEMANDS 
In this section, we move from quantity competition to a more realist framework where firms set prices. 
Notation and assumptions are as in section 3. Since competition is based on prices, we need to differentiate 
firms also when they use the same technology. Therefore, we denote by P2 the degree of differentiation within 
the 'group' (where 'group' stands for all firms using the same technology). Instead, the parameter PI captures 
for the degree of product differentiation across groups as discussed above. Notice that with this notation a 
larger P means more differentiation. We assume that PI> P2' which amounts to saying that firms using the 
same technology are closer to each other than to firms using different technologies. For simplicity, assume that 
total demand is normalized to one and marginal production costs are equal to zero for all firms. 
We use the following notation. Si is the share of total demand corresponding to group i, Silm is firm m's share 




kj ( J] 7PI Iexp -p;" 
S. = "=1 P2 
I P2/ 
N [k j (- P J] 7PI I I exp ----.l!!... 
j=1 "=1 P2 
and 
Hence, market share of firm m belonging to group i is simply Sim = Silm x Si and profits are 
trim = Pim x Sim· 
We can then solve for the first stage of the game. First order condition23 for firm m is: 
23 We assume that both second order condition for a local maximum and stability condition for the equilibrium 
are satisfied. It is easy to check that the second order condition is always satisfied for the simple case where all 
finns are equally differentiated both within and across groups. In general, stability condition is satisfied for N 
small. 
atrim (aSm1i aSi J 
--=Sim + Pim Si--+Smli-- . 
aPim aPim aPim 
Letting (1.1) be equal to zero and simplifying, we get 
where 0 = P2 < 1. By substituting (J.3) in the profit expression we have 
PI 
We now derive a series of results for the case in which P j = p,k j = k, S j = S,j -:t; i . 
Result J.t: In a symmetric equilibrium in prices, an increase in the number of licenses within 






Proof Define X = P; - Pi . Then using (J.3) and the adding up condition, S; + L .S) = 1, one can write 
PI J 
- 1 + -' -2 = - -2 [(1- 0) +S;O(1- S;O)] < 0, where D = (k; -1) + 0(1- S; ) . ax( k 0
2 J 0 
ak; P; D D 
Result J.2: An increase in the number a/licenses within group i, increases group i's market 
share, less than proportionately. 
as. k (0 aXJ Proof -' -' = - - - (N -1)S;k;, which is positive by result J.I above. Recall that we are 
ak; S; k; ak; 
1 
evaluating all expressions at a symmetric outcome, so that S; = - Vi. This implies that 
N 
as; !5... --(0 -k,. aXJ (N -1). 
ak; S; ak; N 
Using result J.l, one can show by induction that 
_ k. ax < N _ 0 so that as;!2 < 1. Notice that this implies _ k; ax < N 
, ak; (N -1)' ak; S; ak; (N -1) 
atr· 
Result J.3: __ , < 0 in a neighborhood of the symmetric equilibrium. 
aki 
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P ,{" a,,; P2[aS;k; 1 (1 0)] d" . b IJ2 Th" I' I rooJ. -- = -2 ---- - - - an It IS negative y resu t .. IS IS a common resu t In a most 
ak; D ak; S; 
all models of oligopolistic competition for which an increase in the number of firms reduces the per-firm profit. 
Notice that when () increases the degree of product differentiation within the group and across the groups 
become similar. For P2 held constant, this means that the differentiation across groups falls, groups compete 
more closely and profits decrease. On the other hand, when groups are less differentiated a decrease in profits 
due to an increase in competition, i.e. a larger ki' is shared across all groups. 
a". a2,,; 0 Result J.4: Holding P2 constant, --' < 0 and --- > . 
ao ak;aO 
a" ,,(1- S) 




" =_ "JI-S) _~(aS)_ (I-S)(1_0 as ). Since as; < ~=_I_<1 allthree 
, aeak D D ak D2 ak ak; k; Nk; , 
terms on the right hand side are positive. 
Result J.S: At any symmetric licensing equilibrium, V;(} > O. 
Proof V:(} = I-S [a,,(k -I) - F]+ [I +a(k -I)]!:. as (I-~). At v; = 0, a,,(k -I) - F > 0 D Dak D 
for k ~ 1 and 0 > D . 
Proposition J.t: In a symmetric equilibrium. the per-group number of firm. k. is decreasing in 
the degree of product differentiation across groups, holding constant the degree of within group 
differentiation. 
Proposition J.l follows because the sign of the effect of an increase in e depends only on the sign of V k9' This 
proposition is analogous to the proposition derived for the differentiated Coumot model in the text. 
Result J.6: V;P2 > 0 . 
~B F 0 
-+-> 
PI P2 
Proposition J.2: For any given level of product differentiation across group, an increase of the 
degree of product differentiation within the group increases the per-group number of firm, k. 
An increment in the degree of product differentiation within the group makes the market more profitable. Each 
licensee competes less fiercely with other firms belonging to the same group, thus increasing the attractiveness 
of licensing. Notice that, unlike the Coumot model, it might well be that a 'unique' patent holder would like to 
license out its technology to competing firms. Indeed, when P2 is large enough industry profits might be 
maximized by an oligopoly (even if N = I). However, the presence of competing technologies still has an 
effect on firms' licensing behavior, which is to increase the number of licenses, k. We did not prove formally 
this result, but one can argue that the case of N = I corresponds to a situation where firms are completely 
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differentiated, that by proposition 1.2 means less licensing at equilibrium. Hence, when we move to N > 1 we 
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Figure 1: A unique symmetric stable licensing equilibrium 
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Figure 4a: Not possible, (jj(k) has at most 3 inflection points 
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Figure 4b: Not possible, ([Jk(l) < 0 and ([J(l) - F > 0 
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Figure 5: VkN > 0 if N > 11, V kN < 0 if N > 11 
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Figure 5e: N* is decreasing in 0" (Jl = 0.98, F = 0.001) 
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